Team Work, Group Efficiency and Performance Essay

Team Work, Group Efficiency and Performance - Essay Example This research will begin with the definition of a team as a group of people working together in an organization. This definition is too general and does not do justice to the functioning of a team in an organizational setting. In purely organizational sense, team is defined as â€Å"a group of workers functioning together as a unit to complete a common goal or purpose†. It is best defined by West as â€Å"groups of people embedded on organizations, performing tasks that contribute to achieving the organization’s goals†. Teams work towards achieving the overall organizational objective and have the necessary resources, autonomy and authority to achieve those objectives. Team and teamwork in an organizational setting can be best understood by the following explanation by Woods and West. The following is a direct quote by Woods and West and has been used directly for better understanding: A team is a relatively small group of people working on a clearly defined, cha llenging task that is most efficiently completed by a group working together rather than individuals working alone or parallel; who have clear, shared, challenging, team level objectives derived directly from the task; who have to work closely and interdependently to achieve these objectives; whose members work in distinct roles within the team (though some roles may be duplicated); and who have the necessary authority, autonomy and resources to enable them to meet the team’s objectives.... They are different types of teams in an organization (Griffin & Moorhead, 2011) but they can be grouped into the following types based on their nature: Problem Solving Teams: These are the most common type of teams and in some cases are used temporarily. Problem solving teams brings together employees with different knowledge backgrounds in order to tackle a specific problem. These teams consist of highly talented and skilled individuals who are brought into the team in order to induce and bring about a specific change (Boone & Kurtz, 2011). Self Managed Work Teams: these are teams with groups of employees who have the skills as well as the authority to manage themselves. Many experts in the field argue that the employees in such teams are the most satisfied and motivated. This is because they have greater job control and task variety (Boone & Kurtz, 2011). Cross Functional Teams: Cross functional teams are the latest trends in the business world. Earlier, teams were formed on the ba sis of specific speciality or functionality. But in today’s dynamic business world this is not enough. Projects are more complex today and need employees with different skill sets and abilities to be working on the same project. Hence, cross functional teams have been formed which consists of individuals with varying skills, expertise and specialities working to achieve a common goal (Robbins, 2009). Virtual Teams: There is no need for teams to be geographically close as developments in communication technology have made it possible for team members to be geographically separated but still work as a single unit. Hence, virtual team is one wherein team members are

Business Process Recommendations Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 1000 words

Business Process Recommendations - Essay Example   Process planning is another area that requires improvement. Improved process planning will allow for the implementation of more efficient production processes. Since the products contain many similar parts and sub-assemblies, we recommend designing a revised assembly process that includes elements of both mass production and batch production. A production line for standard subassemblies will feed the other lines that will produce the four different models.An improved inventory management system is required to allow for adequately meeting customer demands, efficient assembly operations, and cost control. We recommend implementing a continuous inventory system at GTNT. With proper implementation, it is a valuable tool that will control inventory levels, eliminate stock outs, and also minimize risk and total cost.   The various parts for the four models should be located directly adjacent to the production line, so they are easily accessible.   Once all the necessary improvement s are implemented there will be neither more finger neither pointing nor bickering amongst team members, in contrary, the communication and workflow will improve.   After having an accurate forecast, a better inventory system process and making parts accessible to the team next to the production lines will allow the team members to work cohesively with each other.   For example, the new forecast will allow for better planning and management that will communicate to the team member’s daily, weekly and monthly expectations.     

Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant

Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant The Relation between Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant Introduction ‘Every action and choice is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. (Aristotle: 1094a1-3). Philosophy has always been concerned with trying to determine why we do the actions we do: what are we hoping to achieve by performing certain actions? The above quote is Aristotles opening sentence in the Nicomachean ethics, but how are we actually meant to achieve this good that we are aiming for? Many people in the world would be happy to support the claim that the good is achieved by being virtuous but what exactly does this entail? For Aristotle, ‘moral excellence comes about as a result of habit (Aristotle: 1103a16-17) and ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2). It then seems we are safe to claim that the good, (â€Å"moral excellence†), corresponds with happiness, but was he right? And does this happiness include pleasure, or is it excluded? Are virtue and pleasure synonymous? Can they even exist harmoniously at all? Throughout the history of thought, philosophers have attempted to discern that element of human nature that can be most aptly described as the action of taking pleasure in doing certain actions, and in the consequences that arise from any given action. The role of virtue in this pleasure process has been assessed and criticised for hundreds of years; does being virtuous give us pleasure, or does pleasure distract us from doing virtuous things? Is happiness the key to a moral life? My aim in this essay is to address these questions, and related questions, according to the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle. In doing so, I aim to discover what the relation between virtue and pleasure really is, according to these two philosophers. My aim is to discover what the role is of both virtue and pleasure, and the connection between them, in the works of both philosophers, and try to establish where the two philosophies align, and where they are incompatible. At first, it seems as though both philosophers are wholly incompatible in their views of where our morality, our motivation to strive for the good, comes from. Even how the two define what the good is seems to differ too much to offer any similarities. As I briefly mentioned in my opening paragraph, for Aristotle, the purpose of human life is the good, and ‘the highest of all goods achievable by action is happiness. And [many] identify living well and faring well with being happy (Aristotle: 1095a16-19). For Kant however, the question of morality is wrapped up in the concept of â€Å"duty† ‘he does the action without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral worth (Kant 1997: 4:398). In this essay I will explain exactly what both meant, and critically assess their ideas, with the ultimate goal of somehow reconciling the two seemingly opposing viewpoints. In the process of doing this I will first give an explanation of the foundations of these views what part of each philosophers lifes work these ideas about morality have arisen from. Background When examining any philosophical theory I think it is of vital importance to understand how those particular ideas have been formed what part of the writers thought and theories have these ideas originated from? In this section, I will give a brief overview of whereabouts in their respective works do Kant and Aristotle expound their views on morality, in reference to both pleasure and virtue. Aristotles Nicomachean ethics is part of his practical philosophy (along with his Eudemian ethics), and is primarily a search for what the ultimate goal of human life is. Aristotle was a student of Plato, and as such was likely to have been influenced by his philosophy. It is nothing new to philosophy to be preoccupied with morality. Arguably Platos greatest work, The Republic is fundamentally an inquiry into morality and justice, and what sort of society would be best for cultivating â€Å"the moral man†. In book II of The Republic, Plato tells a story of the mythical ring of Gyges, which is a ring that renders the wearer invisible. Glaucon (the teller of this story in the dialogue) claims that no man, no matter how virtuous or just he is, could resist acting immorally if there was no danger of punishment (Plato: 359c-360c). Glaucon does not believe that any man who had no consequences to face would be moral his claim is that we are moral because society forces us to be so, through fear of being reprimanded. In this case, morality becomes a social construct, and has nothing to do with the singular man who would dismiss moral behaviour in an instant if he believed he could avoid castigation. Aristotles ethics do not follow this way of reasoning, he believes that man can be moral within himself, and also that a man is not virtuous simply by performing virtuous actions, ‘his action must [also] proceed from a firm and unchangeable character (Aristotle: 1105a32-33). Aristotle is often misquoted about what he really meant, due to a mistranslation of the original Greek. Aristotle describes the goal of human life as eudaimonia, which is oft translated as happiness. However, the original meaning of this word is something more akin to being ‘blessed as regards ones own spirit (Pakaluk 2005: 47), or more literally, human flourishing. Pakaluk (2005) goes on to explain the fundamental differences between our commonplace definition of happiness and how we must understand it as a translation of eudaimonia. Most importantly we must understand that Aristotles happiness is not a hedonistic happiness where ‘pleasure is regarded as the chief good, or the proper end of act ion (OED 1989). Eudaimonia is a stable, lasting condition, one that does not fluctuate according to day-to-day events it is an ultimate goal rather than a temporary one. It is also objectively universal it is not a subjective condition based upon the wants of each individual it is a state of being, not a mood or inclination, which is similar for all human beings and is characterised as living well ‘the happy man lives well and fares well (Aristotle: 1098b20). Aristotles definition of virtue is also similarly misunderstood. The original Greek is arete which means ‘any sort of excellence or distinctive power (Pakaluk 2005: 5). Thus being a virtuous person means possessing a certain sort of excellence (of character) which leads us to act virtuously. This form of morality bases the value of any action on the character of the agent an agent must be ‘a certain type of person who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or non-actions (Pojman 2002: 160). We cannot take morality from the actions in themselves, because virtue can be demonstrated through the conscious omission of any certain action morality must instead be based upon the agent. For Kant, his views of how pleasure can affect the goodness, or virtue, of any action can be found most clearly in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The Groundwork (1786) comes between the two different versions of the Critique of Pure Reason that were published (1781 and 1787), and there is certainly a crossover of concepts, with Kant utilising some of the arguments of the Critique in the Groundwork. Namely, his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, respectively, the world as it is in itself and the world as it appears to us. This distinction between the true essence of things, and their appearances provides us with ‘two standpoints from which [man] can regard himself and cognize laws for all of his actions (Kant 1987: 4:452). The aim of the Groundwork is to ‘proceed analytically from common cognition to the determination of its supreme principle (Kant 1997: 4:392). In other words, Kant wants to start from the common perception that every action has some sort of moral value and discover what the underlying principle of morality is, that causes this presupposition. This supreme principle that we uncover must be a synthetic a priori one we must be able to deduce it from what we already know, because we are trying to discern how we ought to be from the evidence of how we are. The Groundwork is the quest to discover what this principle is. According to Kant a virtuous person is someone who performs the right actions for the right reasons (which seems to be similar with Aristotles view the action itself does not hold any value the value instead lies within the agents intent). A person who acts thus demonstrates a good will, which is the only thing to which we attribute total merit ‘It is impossible to think of anything that could be considered good without limitation except a good will (Kant 1997: 4:393). This good will possesses worth completely independently of any circumstances, both the means and the ends are good. ‘Even if this will should yet achieve nothing, then [it is still] something that has it full worth in itself In other words, the good will does not need to achieve its end in order to be good, merely the attempt is so. Kant then introduces the concept of duty in order to explain how we are able to manifest the good will in our actions. The concept of duty ‘contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making in unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly (Kant 1997: 4:397). If we do our duty from duty (i.e. for its own sake, because it is the right thing to do, rather than due to some other inclination or motivating desire) then we are doing the right actions for the right reasons we are being virtuous. Kant uses formulations of his categorical imperative in order to demonstrate how we can determine what our duty is, although I will not go into them in this chapter. Kant shows that any system used to deduce our duty must be categorical, and not hypothetical, because a hypothetical imperative tells you how to achieve a certain end if you will x, then you must also will y in order to be able to achieve x. A hypothetical imperative is conditional, it depends on something else. A categorical imperative cannot be so it tells us what we ought to do unconditionally, not on the condition of something else. Kant uses his formulations of the categorical imperative in order to demonstrate when we can say an act is done from duty or not. If an act is done from duty for dutys sake, then it is a virtuous action, if not, then it is not, even if the action is not necessarily â€Å"bad†. Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle Virtue can be taken to have several different meanings; the dictionary definition is ‘conformity of life and conduct with the principles of morality; voluntary observance of the recognized moral laws or standards of right conduct; abstention on moral grounds from any form of wrong-doing or vice (OED 1989). For Aristotle the idea of virtue is the mean between two vices, stray but a little from the middle, and you are no longer being wholly virtuous. This Aristotelian view of virtue is often seen as in direct opposition to the Kantian view of virtue that the virtuous man is the man who acts solely from the motivation of wanting to do his duty, without enjoying the act at all. I will explain in full whether this common view of Kantian ethics is correct in the following chapter, and in this chapter I will explain what I mean by my definition of Aristotelian virtue, and exactly what that signifies in relation to pleasure. Aristotles ethics are usually defined as virtue ethics they are agent centred, and depend (like Kant) not on the act that is done, but instead on what sort of person we need to be, what sort of character we need to have, in order to be able to commit virtuous acts. Aristotle starts off the Nicomachean ethics by trying to discern what the goal of human life is, and in book one manages to come up with what standards he thinks this goal must adhere to what are the characteristics this ultimate goal must have in order to be classed as such? Aristotle states that ‘we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be: for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else (Aristotle: 1097a34-1097b1). Our ultimate goal, the highest good, must be desired for itself only, and not as a means to something else. Aristotle refers to this ultimate goal of human life as eudaimonia, but what does this really mean? Does eudaimonia equate to hedonistic pleasure? Accordingly to Aristotle, eudaimonia is not synonymous with pleasure, he states that ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2), so happiness is the achievement of pure excellence, or of complete virtuousness. Human flourishing is what we achieve when we successfully fulfil the human function when we excel at what it is that makes us distinctly human. This means, that in order to understand this ‘human flourishing which is the ultimate goal of human life, we also need to understand the function of human beings ‘Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. (Aristotle: 1097b22-25). Aristotle believed that everything in the world has an â€Å"ergon†, a function, which is ‘that for the sake of which it exists; therefore the achieving of this work, or, more precisely, its doing so well, is its good; but only a good thing of a kind achieves its function well (Pakaluk 2005: 75). For example, the function of a knife is to cut things, so a good knife must be able to cut things well, therefore a good knife must be sharp. If there is to be a human function, then it will be what makes us essentially human what it is that separates us from everything el se in the world the thing that we are best capable of. But what makes Aristotle believe that humans necessarily have to have a function? Aristotle claims that it is merely common sense that man should have a function, because everything else in the world does ‘Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and man has none? Is he naturally functionless? (Aristotle: 1097b29-30). It seems clear that man must have a function just as any other thing does. So what is this function? If something only achieves its function well if it possesses the certain virtues that make it a good thing of its kind (like sharpness for the knife) then the human function must be something that is best achieved by humans more than anything else in the world. Or even, it may be something that is only achievable by human beings. ‘A virtue is a trait that makes a thing of a certain kind good and in view of which we call a thing of that kind â€Å"good†. (Pakaluk 2005: 75). In this way, Aristotles function argument follows on to an investigation into what qualities human beings possess, what virtues they possess in their character, that makes them distinctively human. In order to find out what the human function is, we need to find something that is distinctive to humans. It cannot be merely living, as that is shared with even plants, and it cannot be perception, because although that rules out plants, it still includes the animal kingdom. Instead the human function must be ‘an active life of the element that has a rational principle (Aristotle: 1098a3-4). In other words the human function, that element of human beings which is characteristic to us alone, is our capability to reason; our rationality. Of course, this definition of the human function as rationality causes some problems in the case of people who have diminished rationality what does this mean for them? Take, for example, the mentally handicapped who have reduced capacities of reason through no fault of their own are they really less capable of living fulfilling and flourishing lives than â€Å"normal† people? Are they â€Å"less good†? It seems as though, according to this argument, we are required to count them as worth less. However, I will not dwell on this problem, as I am more concerned with what this idea of a function implies for the role of pleasure in Aristotles ethics. What then, does it mean that the human function is our capacity to reason? The human function is what we must achieve excellence in, in order to be â€Å"good† (just as the knife must achieve excellence in its function of sharpness, in order to be a good knife). This means that morality, and consequently virtue, are intrinsically linked to the human function, to our rationality it is our reason that allows us to achieve virtue. We must use our reason in order to discern what is virtuous. Our function of rationality is what allows us to achieve our excellence, to achieve our virtue. So how does our reason allow us to achieve our virtue? It allows us to choose whatever course of action we feel would allow us best to achieve our happiness, our telos (ultimate goal). Hursthouse (1991) reads Aristotle as meaning that an action is regarded as â€Å"right† because it is what a virtuous person would choose to do, but is it not the other way round? Does a virtuous person not choose to do certain acts because they are good? This problem is obviously reminiscent of Euthyphros dilemma from the platonic dialogue of the same name is a certain act considered good because God says it is so, or does God say it is so because it is good. For Aristotle the ability to choose the morally right action in any situation is an ability to follow the moral mean ‘that moral excellence is a mean, then, and in what sense is it so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency (Aristotle: 1109a1-3). So for example, the virtue of bravery is the mean between cowardice and rashness. Aristotle also states that virtue is dependent on our character if we have the right character we will be predisposed to commit actions of the right sort. ‘Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit states arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind (Aristotle: 1103b20-22). Therefore, if we habitually perform the right sort of action, then we will generate the right sort of character, thus enabling us to almost automatically choose the correct action, which sits in the middle of this scale between virtue and vice. Our eudaimonia is more and m ore fulfilled by each instance in which our character â€Å"automatically† chooses the virtuous action. Does this idea of virtue as the mean between two vices imply that pleasure is then a vice, being the vice at one end of the scale of the virtue of moderation, whilst the other end is despair? A virtue can be best described as the course of action that allows us to achieve our eudaimonia. So is pleasure more suited to this task than despair (if we take despair to be the other end of the scale)? Would the mean on the scale in actuality lie closer to the end of pleasure than the other? Is this a purely arithmetical mean, the exact midpoint between two extremes, or is it something more flexible? Just as everyone requires different amounts of food in their everyday life (such that everyones â€Å"mean† between scarcity and gluttony differs), would it not make sense that the mean of enjoyment is different for everyone as well? Such that enjoyment of life, whilst it does not mean a slavish commitment to complete hedonistic pleasure, could mean that pleasure does play an important rol e in our lives. I believe that Aristotle would agree with me here, since he states that ‘no one nature or state is or is thought the best for all, neither do all pursue the same pleasure (Aristotle: 1153b29-30). In other words, we do not all desire the same pleasures to the same degree, instead we pursue only those pleasures which are best suited to helping each of us, as an individual, to achieve our eudaimonia. We can therefore agree with Shermans reading of Aristotle, that ‘moral habituation is the cultivation of fine (or noble) pleasures and pains (Sherman 1989: 190). In this way, virtuousness does not mean a complete abandonment of all pleasure, but instead tells us that we should be interested in only those pleasures which are â€Å"worthy† of the rational mind. In some ways this bears similarity with Mills recalculation of Benthams utilitarianism that some pleasures (of the intellect) are worth more in the hedonic calculus than mere physical pleasures (Mill 2001). However, appreciation of the right pleasures is a taught skill also. By that I mean one of habit, such as virtue is according to Aristotle, and as such ‘we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained in the things that we ought (Aristotle: 1104b11-13). What is slightly problematic is that Aristotle gives two seemingly wholly different accounts of what pleasure is. In Book II he states that ‘it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things (Aristotle: 1104b10), by this meaning that a love of pleasure for itself will lead us to ignore the virtuous path and live a life of pure hedonism, thus failing to achieve our telos of eudaimonia. In Book VII he states that ‘the view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying that healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket (Aristotle: 1153a17-18). This view is nonsensical, and would lead us to having to avoiding almost every type of activity. Some pleasures are bad, but this does not necessarily make all pleasures bad. However, whilst these two accounts do differ, there is a common theme between them, which is that pleasure is not necessarily bad, and can exist in harmony with virtue. However, we need to qualify exactly what pleasures we mean here, as not all pleasure can be called good. Annas (1980) interprets Aristotle as believing that pleasure is only good when done by the virtuousness man, because the habit of his character will lead him to only choose to act on those pleasures which are virtuous ‘it is right for the good man to seek pleasure; pleasure will point him in the right direction. (Annas 1980: 286). Whereas the man who is immoral in habit will only persue those pleasures which ‘confirm the deplorable tendencies of [him], since it will strengthen his habits of wickedness and weakness (Annas 1980: 286-7). Here, the important point is not that we need to avoid pleasure, but that we need to be sure that we are pursuing the right kind of pleasure before we act upon it the pl easure of the virtuous man, not the deplorable man. The obvious problem with this interpretation is that Annas at first glance seems to be claiming that only a good person can access pleasure in a good way. Where does this leave the immoral man who wishes to reform his character? Is there no possibility that he will be able to choose those pleasures that are good for his character? Is this what Aristotle is really saying when he claims that virtue is a matter of habit, of character? ‘If the things [the good man] finds tiresome seem pleasant to someone, that is nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this condition. (Aristotle: 1176a19-22). This quote for one certainly seems to be suggesting that the virtuous man will be able to steer clear of immoral pleasures, whilst the immoral man will not. Aristotle emphasizes several times the fact that his ethics is based upon repeated behaviour, on habit, and ‘a short time [or virtuousness], does not make a man blessed or happy (Aristotle: 1098a18-19). What this means is that a period of immorality in a mans life does not necessarily preclude him from ever achieving his eudaimonia, and similarly, a brief period of virtuousness does not make a man wholly virtuous. Aristotles ethics is a system of right and wrong that demonstrates itself through habit, and habits can change, although it may be hard to dispose of bad habits, of immoral habits, because ‘it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion [for immoral pleasures] (Aristotle:1105a2-3). This does not mean that it is impossible, indeed it must be possible to change our character, otherwise what we are taught in our youth would be how we remain for life, meaning that whether we become a good or a bad person depends mor e on our teachers, rather than any attempt at morality by ourselves. We cannot be deprived of a chance at our eudaimonia just because we fail to receive the right training of character in our youth. It must be possible to reform and for the immoral man to pursue good pleasure or how else can he become a man who chooses only good pleasures out of habit? Some might claim that this seems unfair. If moral virtue is merely an act brought about by habit, then it is far easier for the good man to be virtuous that it is for the bad man to be so so where is the incentive for the bad man to change his ways and attempt to cultivate the right sort of character in order to be good by habit? But ‘even the good is better when it is harder (Aristotle: 1105a10), and the bad man will be rewarded if he perseveres. If a bad man successfully changes his character to that of the virtuous man, then he is satisfying the human function, the human ergon, and he will be able to achieve the ultimate telos for human beings eudaimonia his human flourishing. The incentive for the bad man to change his ways, no matter how difficult it may be, is that he will achieve the ultimate goal of complete happiness. In this way does the right sort of pleasure, lead first to the cultivation of a habit of character of complete excellence or virtue, which in turn then leads to ultimate happiness. However, as Hutchinson (1986) points out, there is a problem with this idea that, ultimately, restraint over which pleasures we decide to pursue is how we describe virtue. If ‘discipline produces virtue and, when misguided, defect of character, by means of pleasure and pain, the virtues (and vices) are dispositions for enjoying and disliking things (Hutchinson 1986: 79). Hutchinson goes on to state that this cannot be so, because children are rewarded in the study of arithmetic through pleasure and pain. So then ‘arithmetical skill is a disposition to enjoy or dislike certain mathematical operations. And that is not true; it is simply a disposition to come to the right answer (Hutchinson 1986: 79). For Hutchinson Aristotles argument is unsuccessful merely because it is too vague, a vagueness which allows for the arithmetical comparison to be made, and this would not be a fault suffered if the argument was constructed with more care. Ultimately, this means that although th e argument is open to criticism, it leaves Aristotle quite confident in his claim that virtue is a form of character, created by the repeated habit of choosing the correct moral path that of the virtue at the mean point between two vices. And it is this mean point which will ultimately lead to eudaimonia. As long as pleasure is taken in moderation, it can still be synonymous with virtue, and allows for pleasure to be a part of our eudaimonia, the ultimate goal of human flourishing. Virtue and Pleasure in Kant For Kant being virtuous means acting in accordance with duty, for dutys sake, and not due to some other motivation in the place of duty (even if the same action would result).There are some philosophers (I will go into detail further on) who have claimed that Kants notion of duty eliminates the possibility of pleasure that is, if you take pleasure in any said action, it eliminates any dutiful intent that was previously present. However, I do not believe this is actually what Kant meant, and in this chapter I will explain why I believe this and attempt to elucidate exactly what Kant meant when he talked about duty, and the implications this has for our conception of pleasure. For Kant, an action can only have moral worth (i.e. be virtuous) if and only if it is done from duty, for dutys sake. So, in order to understand exactly when we can claim under Kants theory that we are being virtuous, we need to understand exactly how we are meant to do our duty, and to do this, we need to examine the categorical imperative. Although Kant does state that there is only one categorical imperative, ‘he offers three different formulas of that law (Sullivan 1989: 149) so sometimes in philosophy the term is used more generally to describe these three formulas (and their associated examples) as a whole, rather than just the first formula by itself. Kant states that ‘there is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative (Kant 1987: 4:421), but what is it, and how does he come to this conclusion? As I mentioned before, any categorical imperative must be synthetic because defining our morality depends on being able to formulate a synthetic a priori principle. A synthetic principle adds something new to our knowledge, and if it is also a priori, it means that this new knowledge does not depend on experience we are able to deduce this synthetic principle independently of any particular experience; we are able to deduce it by examining what we already know to be true about the world. This is because, for Kant, moral judgements are based on how the world ought to be, not how it is, so we cannot depend on our experiences of the world as it is to show us how the world should instead be. Morality cannot be based on experience, because we need an ethical theory that is capable of telling us what we should do, even in entirely n ew circumstances. The categorical imperative is essentially a law, because while everything in the world is subject to the laws of nature, only rational beings possess autonomy, possess a â€Å"(free) will†, so are capable of choosing to act according to any given law. ‘The idea of an objective principle in so far as it is compelling to the will, is called a command of reason, and the formula of the command is called an imperative. (Russell 2007: 644) Therefore, a theory of practical morality would be a theory of commands about how to act according to certain laws. A theory of morality would be a theory consisting of imperatives. Kant refers to his categorical imperative as the only one, because ‘logically there can be only one ultimate moral law [although] each of the three formulas emphasizes a different aspect of the same moral law (Sullivan 1989: 49). The aim of the Groundwork is to prove that such a principle (what Kant calls the categorical imperative) does exist. Such a principle would be the supreme principle of morality (Kant 1997: 4:392), in other words, the categorical imperative is synonymous with morality. Kant describes the categorical imperative, through three different formulas. The first is the formula of the universal law ‘act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (Kant 1997: 4:421). This law is Kants ‘single categorical imperative (Kant 1997: 4:421); however this is not exactly what our duty is, since the ‘universality of law in accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is properly called nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). This means that in order for something to be our duty, it must be determined in accordance with universal laws, because duty is not subjective to each individual, but is something that is the same fo r all rational beings, in so far as we are rational. This means that our duty can and should be phrased as: ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). Kant uses four examples Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant The Relation between Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle and Kant Introduction ‘Every action and choice is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. (Aristotle: 1094a1-3). Philosophy has always been concerned with trying to determine why we do the actions we do: what are we hoping to achieve by performing certain actions? The above quote is Aristotles opening sentence in the Nicomachean ethics, but how are we actually meant to achieve this good that we are aiming for? Many people in the world would be happy to support the claim that the good is achieved by being virtuous but what exactly does this entail? For Aristotle, ‘moral excellence comes about as a result of habit (Aristotle: 1103a16-17) and ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2). It then seems we are safe to claim that the good, (â€Å"moral excellence†), corresponds with happiness, but was he right? And does this happiness include pleasure, or is it excluded? Are virtue and pleasure synonymous? Can they even exist harmoniously at all? Throughout the history of thought, philosophers have attempted to discern that element of human nature that can be most aptly described as the action of taking pleasure in doing certain actions, and in the consequences that arise from any given action. The role of virtue in this pleasure process has been assessed and criticised for hundreds of years; does being virtuous give us pleasure, or does pleasure distract us from doing virtuous things? Is happiness the key to a moral life? My aim in this essay is to address these questions, and related questions, according to the philosophies of Kant and Aristotle. In doing so, I aim to discover what the relation between virtue and pleasure really is, according to these two philosophers. My aim is to discover what the role is of both virtue and pleasure, and the connection between them, in the works of both philosophers, and try to establish where the two philosophies align, and where they are incompatible. At first, it seems as though both philosophers are wholly incompatible in their views of where our morality, our motivation to strive for the good, comes from. Even how the two define what the good is seems to differ too much to offer any similarities. As I briefly mentioned in my opening paragraph, for Aristotle, the purpose of human life is the good, and ‘the highest of all goods achievable by action is happiness. And [many] identify living well and faring well with being happy (Aristotle: 1095a16-19). For Kant however, the question of morality is wrapped up in the concept of â€Å"duty† ‘he does the action without any inclination, simply from duty; then the action first has its genuine moral worth (Kant 1997: 4:398). In this essay I will explain exactly what both meant, and critically assess their ideas, with the ultimate goal of somehow reconciling the two seemingly opposing viewpoints. In the process of doing this I will first give an explanation of the foundations of these views what part of each philosophers lifes work these ideas about morality have arisen from. Background When examining any philosophical theory I think it is of vital importance to understand how those particular ideas have been formed what part of the writers thought and theories have these ideas originated from? In this section, I will give a brief overview of whereabouts in their respective works do Kant and Aristotle expound their views on morality, in reference to both pleasure and virtue. Aristotles Nicomachean ethics is part of his practical philosophy (along with his Eudemian ethics), and is primarily a search for what the ultimate goal of human life is. Aristotle was a student of Plato, and as such was likely to have been influenced by his philosophy. It is nothing new to philosophy to be preoccupied with morality. Arguably Platos greatest work, The Republic is fundamentally an inquiry into morality and justice, and what sort of society would be best for cultivating â€Å"the moral man†. In book II of The Republic, Plato tells a story of the mythical ring of Gyges, which is a ring that renders the wearer invisible. Glaucon (the teller of this story in the dialogue) claims that no man, no matter how virtuous or just he is, could resist acting immorally if there was no danger of punishment (Plato: 359c-360c). Glaucon does not believe that any man who had no consequences to face would be moral his claim is that we are moral because society forces us to be so, through fear of being reprimanded. In this case, morality becomes a social construct, and has nothing to do with the singular man who would dismiss moral behaviour in an instant if he believed he could avoid castigation. Aristotles ethics do not follow this way of reasoning, he believes that man can be moral within himself, and also that a man is not virtuous simply by performing virtuous actions, ‘his action must [also] proceed from a firm and unchangeable character (Aristotle: 1105a32-33). Aristotle is often misquoted about what he really meant, due to a mistranslation of the original Greek. Aristotle describes the goal of human life as eudaimonia, which is oft translated as happiness. However, the original meaning of this word is something more akin to being ‘blessed as regards ones own spirit (Pakaluk 2005: 47), or more literally, human flourishing. Pakaluk (2005) goes on to explain the fundamental differences between our commonplace definition of happiness and how we must understand it as a translation of eudaimonia. Most importantly we must understand that Aristotles happiness is not a hedonistic happiness where ‘pleasure is regarded as the chief good, or the proper end of act ion (OED 1989). Eudaimonia is a stable, lasting condition, one that does not fluctuate according to day-to-day events it is an ultimate goal rather than a temporary one. It is also objectively universal it is not a subjective condition based upon the wants of each individual it is a state of being, not a mood or inclination, which is similar for all human beings and is characterised as living well ‘the happy man lives well and fares well (Aristotle: 1098b20). Aristotles definition of virtue is also similarly misunderstood. The original Greek is arete which means ‘any sort of excellence or distinctive power (Pakaluk 2005: 5). Thus being a virtuous person means possessing a certain sort of excellence (of character) which leads us to act virtuously. This form of morality bases the value of any action on the character of the agent an agent must be ‘a certain type of person who will no doubt manifest his or her being in actions or non-actions (Pojman 2002: 160). We cannot take morality from the actions in themselves, because virtue can be demonstrated through the conscious omission of any certain action morality must instead be based upon the agent. For Kant, his views of how pleasure can affect the goodness, or virtue, of any action can be found most clearly in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The Groundwork (1786) comes between the two different versions of the Critique of Pure Reason that were published (1781 and 1787), and there is certainly a crossover of concepts, with Kant utilising some of the arguments of the Critique in the Groundwork. Namely, his distinction between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds, respectively, the world as it is in itself and the world as it appears to us. This distinction between the true essence of things, and their appearances provides us with ‘two standpoints from which [man] can regard himself and cognize laws for all of his actions (Kant 1987: 4:452). The aim of the Groundwork is to ‘proceed analytically from common cognition to the determination of its supreme principle (Kant 1997: 4:392). In other words, Kant wants to start from the common perception that every action has some sort of moral value and discover what the underlying principle of morality is, that causes this presupposition. This supreme principle that we uncover must be a synthetic a priori one we must be able to deduce it from what we already know, because we are trying to discern how we ought to be from the evidence of how we are. The Groundwork is the quest to discover what this principle is. According to Kant a virtuous person is someone who performs the right actions for the right reasons (which seems to be similar with Aristotles view the action itself does not hold any value the value instead lies within the agents intent). A person who acts thus demonstrates a good will, which is the only thing to which we attribute total merit ‘It is impossible to think of anything that could be considered good without limitation except a good will (Kant 1997: 4:393). This good will possesses worth completely independently of any circumstances, both the means and the ends are good. ‘Even if this will should yet achieve nothing, then [it is still] something that has it full worth in itself In other words, the good will does not need to achieve its end in order to be good, merely the attempt is so. Kant then introduces the concept of duty in order to explain how we are able to manifest the good will in our actions. The concept of duty ‘contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making in unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly (Kant 1997: 4:397). If we do our duty from duty (i.e. for its own sake, because it is the right thing to do, rather than due to some other inclination or motivating desire) then we are doing the right actions for the right reasons we are being virtuous. Kant uses formulations of his categorical imperative in order to demonstrate how we can determine what our duty is, although I will not go into them in this chapter. Kant shows that any system used to deduce our duty must be categorical, and not hypothetical, because a hypothetical imperative tells you how to achieve a certain end if you will x, then you must also will y in order to be able to achieve x. A hypothetical imperative is conditional, it depends on something else. A categorical imperative cannot be so it tells us what we ought to do unconditionally, not on the condition of something else. Kant uses his formulations of the categorical imperative in order to demonstrate when we can say an act is done from duty or not. If an act is done from duty for dutys sake, then it is a virtuous action, if not, then it is not, even if the action is not necessarily â€Å"bad†. Virtue and Pleasure in Aristotle Virtue can be taken to have several different meanings; the dictionary definition is ‘conformity of life and conduct with the principles of morality; voluntary observance of the recognized moral laws or standards of right conduct; abstention on moral grounds from any form of wrong-doing or vice (OED 1989). For Aristotle the idea of virtue is the mean between two vices, stray but a little from the middle, and you are no longer being wholly virtuous. This Aristotelian view of virtue is often seen as in direct opposition to the Kantian view of virtue that the virtuous man is the man who acts solely from the motivation of wanting to do his duty, without enjoying the act at all. I will explain in full whether this common view of Kantian ethics is correct in the following chapter, and in this chapter I will explain what I mean by my definition of Aristotelian virtue, and exactly what that signifies in relation to pleasure. Aristotles ethics are usually defined as virtue ethics they are agent centred, and depend (like Kant) not on the act that is done, but instead on what sort of person we need to be, what sort of character we need to have, in order to be able to commit virtuous acts. Aristotle starts off the Nicomachean ethics by trying to discern what the goal of human life is, and in book one manages to come up with what standards he thinks this goal must adhere to what are the characteristics this ultimate goal must have in order to be classed as such? Aristotle states that ‘we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be: for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else (Aristotle: 1097a34-1097b1). Our ultimate goal, the highest good, must be desired for itself only, and not as a means to something else. Aristotle refers to this ultimate goal of human life as eudaimonia, but what does this really mean? Does eudaimonia equate to hedonistic pleasure? Accordingly to Aristotle, eudaimonia is not synonymous with pleasure, he states that ‘happiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence (Aristotle: 1102a1-2), so happiness is the achievement of pure excellence, or of complete virtuousness. Human flourishing is what we achieve when we successfully fulfil the human function when we excel at what it is that makes us distinctly human. This means, that in order to understand this ‘human flourishing which is the ultimate goal of human life, we also need to understand the function of human beings ‘Presumably, however, to say that happiness is the chief good seems a platitude, and a clearer account of what it is is still desired. This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the function of man. (Aristotle: 1097b22-25). Aristotle believed that everything in the world has an â€Å"ergon†, a function, which is ‘that for the sake of which it exists; therefore the achieving of this work, or, more precisely, its doing so well, is its good; but only a good thing of a kind achieves its function well (Pakaluk 2005: 75). For example, the function of a knife is to cut things, so a good knife must be able to cut things well, therefore a good knife must be sharp. If there is to be a human function, then it will be what makes us essentially human what it is that separates us from everything el se in the world the thing that we are best capable of. But what makes Aristotle believe that humans necessarily have to have a function? Aristotle claims that it is merely common sense that man should have a function, because everything else in the world does ‘Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain functions or activities, and man has none? Is he naturally functionless? (Aristotle: 1097b29-30). It seems clear that man must have a function just as any other thing does. So what is this function? If something only achieves its function well if it possesses the certain virtues that make it a good thing of its kind (like sharpness for the knife) then the human function must be something that is best achieved by humans more than anything else in the world. Or even, it may be something that is only achievable by human beings. ‘A virtue is a trait that makes a thing of a certain kind good and in view of which we call a thing of that kind â€Å"good†. (Pakaluk 2005: 75). In this way, Aristotles function argument follows on to an investigation into what qualities human beings possess, what virtues they possess in their character, that makes them distinctively human. In order to find out what the human function is, we need to find something that is distinctive to humans. It cannot be merely living, as that is shared with even plants, and it cannot be perception, because although that rules out plants, it still includes the animal kingdom. Instead the human function must be ‘an active life of the element that has a rational principle (Aristotle: 1098a3-4). In other words the human function, that element of human beings which is characteristic to us alone, is our capability to reason; our rationality. Of course, this definition of the human function as rationality causes some problems in the case of people who have diminished rationality what does this mean for them? Take, for example, the mentally handicapped who have reduced capacities of reason through no fault of their own are they really less capable of living fulfilling and flourishing lives than â€Å"normal† people? Are they â€Å"less good†? It seems as though, according to this argument, we are required to count them as worth less. However, I will not dwell on this problem, as I am more concerned with what this idea of a function implies for the role of pleasure in Aristotles ethics. What then, does it mean that the human function is our capacity to reason? The human function is what we must achieve excellence in, in order to be â€Å"good† (just as the knife must achieve excellence in its function of sharpness, in order to be a good knife). This means that morality, and consequently virtue, are intrinsically linked to the human function, to our rationality it is our reason that allows us to achieve virtue. We must use our reason in order to discern what is virtuous. Our function of rationality is what allows us to achieve our excellence, to achieve our virtue. So how does our reason allow us to achieve our virtue? It allows us to choose whatever course of action we feel would allow us best to achieve our happiness, our telos (ultimate goal). Hursthouse (1991) reads Aristotle as meaning that an action is regarded as â€Å"right† because it is what a virtuous person would choose to do, but is it not the other way round? Does a virtuous person not choose to do certain acts because they are good? This problem is obviously reminiscent of Euthyphros dilemma from the platonic dialogue of the same name is a certain act considered good because God says it is so, or does God say it is so because it is good. For Aristotle the ability to choose the morally right action in any situation is an ability to follow the moral mean ‘that moral excellence is a mean, then, and in what sense is it so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency (Aristotle: 1109a1-3). So for example, the virtue of bravery is the mean between cowardice and rashness. Aristotle also states that virtue is dependent on our character if we have the right character we will be predisposed to commit actions of the right sort. ‘Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit states arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind (Aristotle: 1103b20-22). Therefore, if we habitually perform the right sort of action, then we will generate the right sort of character, thus enabling us to almost automatically choose the correct action, which sits in the middle of this scale between virtue and vice. Our eudaimonia is more and m ore fulfilled by each instance in which our character â€Å"automatically† chooses the virtuous action. Does this idea of virtue as the mean between two vices imply that pleasure is then a vice, being the vice at one end of the scale of the virtue of moderation, whilst the other end is despair? A virtue can be best described as the course of action that allows us to achieve our eudaimonia. So is pleasure more suited to this task than despair (if we take despair to be the other end of the scale)? Would the mean on the scale in actuality lie closer to the end of pleasure than the other? Is this a purely arithmetical mean, the exact midpoint between two extremes, or is it something more flexible? Just as everyone requires different amounts of food in their everyday life (such that everyones â€Å"mean† between scarcity and gluttony differs), would it not make sense that the mean of enjoyment is different for everyone as well? Such that enjoyment of life, whilst it does not mean a slavish commitment to complete hedonistic pleasure, could mean that pleasure does play an important rol e in our lives. I believe that Aristotle would agree with me here, since he states that ‘no one nature or state is or is thought the best for all, neither do all pursue the same pleasure (Aristotle: 1153b29-30). In other words, we do not all desire the same pleasures to the same degree, instead we pursue only those pleasures which are best suited to helping each of us, as an individual, to achieve our eudaimonia. We can therefore agree with Shermans reading of Aristotle, that ‘moral habituation is the cultivation of fine (or noble) pleasures and pains (Sherman 1989: 190). In this way, virtuousness does not mean a complete abandonment of all pleasure, but instead tells us that we should be interested in only those pleasures which are â€Å"worthy† of the rational mind. In some ways this bears similarity with Mills recalculation of Benthams utilitarianism that some pleasures (of the intellect) are worth more in the hedonic calculus than mere physical pleasures (Mill 2001). However, appreciation of the right pleasures is a taught skill also. By that I mean one of habit, such as virtue is according to Aristotle, and as such ‘we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained in the things that we ought (Aristotle: 1104b11-13). What is slightly problematic is that Aristotle gives two seemingly wholly different accounts of what pleasure is. In Book II he states that ‘it is on account of pleasure that we do bad things (Aristotle: 1104b10), by this meaning that a love of pleasure for itself will lead us to ignore the virtuous path and live a life of pure hedonism, thus failing to achieve our telos of eudaimonia. In Book VII he states that ‘the view that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are unhealthy is like saying that healthy things are bad because some healthy things are bad for the pocket (Aristotle: 1153a17-18). This view is nonsensical, and would lead us to having to avoiding almost every type of activity. Some pleasures are bad, but this does not necessarily make all pleasures bad. However, whilst these two accounts do differ, there is a common theme between them, which is that pleasure is not necessarily bad, and can exist in harmony with virtue. However, we need to qualify exactly what pleasures we mean here, as not all pleasure can be called good. Annas (1980) interprets Aristotle as believing that pleasure is only good when done by the virtuousness man, because the habit of his character will lead him to only choose to act on those pleasures which are virtuous ‘it is right for the good man to seek pleasure; pleasure will point him in the right direction. (Annas 1980: 286). Whereas the man who is immoral in habit will only persue those pleasures which ‘confirm the deplorable tendencies of [him], since it will strengthen his habits of wickedness and weakness (Annas 1980: 286-7). Here, the important point is not that we need to avoid pleasure, but that we need to be sure that we are pursuing the right kind of pleasure before we act upon it the pl easure of the virtuous man, not the deplorable man. The obvious problem with this interpretation is that Annas at first glance seems to be claiming that only a good person can access pleasure in a good way. Where does this leave the immoral man who wishes to reform his character? Is there no possibility that he will be able to choose those pleasures that are good for his character? Is this what Aristotle is really saying when he claims that virtue is a matter of habit, of character? ‘If the things [the good man] finds tiresome seem pleasant to someone, that is nothing surprising; for men may be ruined and spoilt in many ways; but the things are not pleasant, but only pleasant to these people and to people in this condition. (Aristotle: 1176a19-22). This quote for one certainly seems to be suggesting that the virtuous man will be able to steer clear of immoral pleasures, whilst the immoral man will not. Aristotle emphasizes several times the fact that his ethics is based upon repeated behaviour, on habit, and ‘a short time [or virtuousness], does not make a man blessed or happy (Aristotle: 1098a18-19). What this means is that a period of immorality in a mans life does not necessarily preclude him from ever achieving his eudaimonia, and similarly, a brief period of virtuousness does not make a man wholly virtuous. Aristotles ethics is a system of right and wrong that demonstrates itself through habit, and habits can change, although it may be hard to dispose of bad habits, of immoral habits, because ‘it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion [for immoral pleasures] (Aristotle:1105a2-3). This does not mean that it is impossible, indeed it must be possible to change our character, otherwise what we are taught in our youth would be how we remain for life, meaning that whether we become a good or a bad person depends mor e on our teachers, rather than any attempt at morality by ourselves. We cannot be deprived of a chance at our eudaimonia just because we fail to receive the right training of character in our youth. It must be possible to reform and for the immoral man to pursue good pleasure or how else can he become a man who chooses only good pleasures out of habit? Some might claim that this seems unfair. If moral virtue is merely an act brought about by habit, then it is far easier for the good man to be virtuous that it is for the bad man to be so so where is the incentive for the bad man to change his ways and attempt to cultivate the right sort of character in order to be good by habit? But ‘even the good is better when it is harder (Aristotle: 1105a10), and the bad man will be rewarded if he perseveres. If a bad man successfully changes his character to that of the virtuous man, then he is satisfying the human function, the human ergon, and he will be able to achieve the ultimate telos for human beings eudaimonia his human flourishing. The incentive for the bad man to change his ways, no matter how difficult it may be, is that he will achieve the ultimate goal of complete happiness. In this way does the right sort of pleasure, lead first to the cultivation of a habit of character of complete excellence or virtue, which in turn then leads to ultimate happiness. However, as Hutchinson (1986) points out, there is a problem with this idea that, ultimately, restraint over which pleasures we decide to pursue is how we describe virtue. If ‘discipline produces virtue and, when misguided, defect of character, by means of pleasure and pain, the virtues (and vices) are dispositions for enjoying and disliking things (Hutchinson 1986: 79). Hutchinson goes on to state that this cannot be so, because children are rewarded in the study of arithmetic through pleasure and pain. So then ‘arithmetical skill is a disposition to enjoy or dislike certain mathematical operations. And that is not true; it is simply a disposition to come to the right answer (Hutchinson 1986: 79). For Hutchinson Aristotles argument is unsuccessful merely because it is too vague, a vagueness which allows for the arithmetical comparison to be made, and this would not be a fault suffered if the argument was constructed with more care. Ultimately, this means that although th e argument is open to criticism, it leaves Aristotle quite confident in his claim that virtue is a form of character, created by the repeated habit of choosing the correct moral path that of the virtue at the mean point between two vices. And it is this mean point which will ultimately lead to eudaimonia. As long as pleasure is taken in moderation, it can still be synonymous with virtue, and allows for pleasure to be a part of our eudaimonia, the ultimate goal of human flourishing. Virtue and Pleasure in Kant For Kant being virtuous means acting in accordance with duty, for dutys sake, and not due to some other motivation in the place of duty (even if the same action would result).There are some philosophers (I will go into detail further on) who have claimed that Kants notion of duty eliminates the possibility of pleasure that is, if you take pleasure in any said action, it eliminates any dutiful intent that was previously present. However, I do not believe this is actually what Kant meant, and in this chapter I will explain why I believe this and attempt to elucidate exactly what Kant meant when he talked about duty, and the implications this has for our conception of pleasure. For Kant, an action can only have moral worth (i.e. be virtuous) if and only if it is done from duty, for dutys sake. So, in order to understand exactly when we can claim under Kants theory that we are being virtuous, we need to understand exactly how we are meant to do our duty, and to do this, we need to examine the categorical imperative. Although Kant does state that there is only one categorical imperative, ‘he offers three different formulas of that law (Sullivan 1989: 149) so sometimes in philosophy the term is used more generally to describe these three formulas (and their associated examples) as a whole, rather than just the first formula by itself. Kant states that ‘there is, therefore, only a single categorical imperative (Kant 1987: 4:421), but what is it, and how does he come to this conclusion? As I mentioned before, any categorical imperative must be synthetic because defining our morality depends on being able to formulate a synthetic a priori principle. A synthetic principle adds something new to our knowledge, and if it is also a priori, it means that this new knowledge does not depend on experience we are able to deduce this synthetic principle independently of any particular experience; we are able to deduce it by examining what we already know to be true about the world. This is because, for Kant, moral judgements are based on how the world ought to be, not how it is, so we cannot depend on our experiences of the world as it is to show us how the world should instead be. Morality cannot be based on experience, because we need an ethical theory that is capable of telling us what we should do, even in entirely n ew circumstances. The categorical imperative is essentially a law, because while everything in the world is subject to the laws of nature, only rational beings possess autonomy, possess a â€Å"(free) will†, so are capable of choosing to act according to any given law. ‘The idea of an objective principle in so far as it is compelling to the will, is called a command of reason, and the formula of the command is called an imperative. (Russell 2007: 644) Therefore, a theory of practical morality would be a theory of commands about how to act according to certain laws. A theory of morality would be a theory consisting of imperatives. Kant refers to his categorical imperative as the only one, because ‘logically there can be only one ultimate moral law [although] each of the three formulas emphasizes a different aspect of the same moral law (Sullivan 1989: 49). The aim of the Groundwork is to prove that such a principle (what Kant calls the categorical imperative) does exist. Such a principle would be the supreme principle of morality (Kant 1997: 4:392), in other words, the categorical imperative is synonymous with morality. Kant describes the categorical imperative, through three different formulas. The first is the formula of the universal law ‘act only in accordance with the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law (Kant 1997: 4:421). This law is Kants ‘single categorical imperative (Kant 1997: 4:421); however this is not exactly what our duty is, since the ‘universality of law in accordance with which effects take place constitutes what is properly called nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). This means that in order for something to be our duty, it must be determined in accordance with universal laws, because duty is not subjective to each individual, but is something that is the same fo r all rational beings, in so far as we are rational. This means that our duty can and should be phrased as: ‘act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature. (Kant 1997: 4:421). Kant uses four examples

Essay on the Character of Caleb Trask in John Steinbecks East of Eden :: East Eden Essays

The Character of Caleb Trask in East of Eden Cal Trask is one of the most complex characters in John Steinbeck's East of Eden. Through Cal's childhood experiences, his personal motives, and his internal conflict, Steinbeck shows the development of Cal's character. First of all, the most important childhood experience which affects Cal's life is Adam's 12 year abandonment of his sons. Since Cathy ran away, the twins have no mother figure to give them tenderness as they grow up. This absence of open affection leaves Cal unable to express his needs for love and attention. Only Lee, the Chinese servant, is there to guide Cal and Aron. Since Cal is the more dominant of the two brothers, he learns to manipulate Aron and others around him. He takes this role because, while "no one liked Cal very much... Aron drew love from every side"(Steinbeck 551). Lee observes that "he's [Cal] fighting for his life and his brother doesn't have to fight [for his father's love and affection]"(386). Cal's well-intentioned motives are mostly aimed at winning his father's love. He sacrifices his pride and asks Will Hamilton to help him raise money to replace the money Adam lost in the lettuce adventure. When Adam rejects the money, he in effect rejects Cal, which is "brutal, and unfeeling, and this after he had begun a cordial relationship with his son"(Fontenrose 375). Cal is so distraught that he lashes out at Aron, his father's favorite son, by telling him the truth about their mother. This act is a contrast to a similar crossroad earlier in the novel when Cal doesn't tell Aron the truth about his mother because "he didn't think Aron could handle it at all" (586). Cal also withholds the information in an effort to be "good," and because Cal knows that the revelation of his knowledge of this secret would bring pain to Adam, the man he loves the most. Finally, Cal is faced with his internal struggle of good versus evil. This struggle is partly caused by his traumatic child experiences. He struggles with the question of whether his evil actions are the result of his own evilness or his mother's wickedness. He tries to combat this wickedness that he sees within himself by trying to acquire affection, especially his father's, through good deeds and being more pleasant towards other. However, he strikes out at others whenever he feels rejected by Adam, and he fights the urge to strike out at Aron, who Cal believes is Adam's favorite son, by using his most devastating weapon---the truth about their mother.

Opinion on the novel The Zahir

The Zahir Life, happiness, love, loss, and obsession characterize the latest novel that I have read – The Zahir written by the Brazilian writer Paulo Coelho. The title itself revealed an interesting feeling and curiosity to the readers. The term â€Å"Zahir† comes from the Islamic tradition which means visible and incapable of going unnoticed. This international bestseller novel is a piece of art full of surprises and mysteries.The tory is about the narrator, a bestselling novelist who lived by enjoying all the pleasures and privileges – money, fame, power, and celebrity brings. For unknown reasons, he was abandoned by his own wife named Esther, a war-correspondent. The simple language used by the writer is so powerful and persuasive that would allow readers to feel the intensity of the scenes. Moreover, the writer used the first- person point of view to provoke effectively emotional situations. Paulo Coelho also ade use of imagery.As an adventurous person, I app reciate most the narrator's pilgrimage. I felt like I was also traveling by reading the narrator's search for his own self and wife from Paris to Kazakhstan. Along the Journey with special significance, the novel showed virtues like generosity to the poor, spirituality, patience, love, respect and knowing oneself to have genuine happiness. Finally in the later part, the narrator was able to meet Esther and whether to stay with him or not lies in her ecisions.I can say that the ending is worth reading and waiting because of the enjoying tension. After reading the whole story, I can deduce that the author is someone who is full of experiences and wisdom; and maybe he's also in search for something very significant. The Zahir represents a human experience†¦ after reading it, readers would learn again how to love and forgive in an unselfish way, and most especially, how to live life to the fullest.

Intertextuality: Meaning of Life and Silk Cut Essay

What is intertextuality? How does intertextuality challenge E. D. Hirsch’s idea that a text has a single meaning created by its author? Explain with reference to examples drawn from any media format. According to American literary critic, E. D. Hirsch, in order to interpret a body of text, one must ask one’s self the only question that can be answered objectively ? â€Å"what, in all probability, did the author mean to convey? † He believed that the author’s intended meaning equates the meaning of a text and it is in fact, the reader’s duty to uncover the the author’s intentions. â€Å"The meaning of a text and its author’s intentions are one and the same. † Hirsch’s concept revolves around the assumption that a body of text is original, and is purely a body of the author’s sole â€Å"intentions†. The production of text, if one were to adhere to Hirsch’s theory, is therefore exclusive to the author’s own ideas and concepts and free of external influence. However, the notions of langue and parole disputes this idea. According to Barthes in 1984, â€Å"It [la langue] is the social part of language, the individual cannot himself either create or modify it†. Furthermore, Ferdinand de Saussure’s work on structuralism and semiotics demonstrates the subjectivity of language and can be said to have sewn the seeds for modern concepts of intertextuality (such as those developed by Roland Barthes and Julia Kristeva). Intertextuality challenges the idea of a text’s ability to be truly original and therefore disagrees with Hirsch’s theory. In this essay, I will focus on how conscious intertextuality as well as the semiotics involved in unconscious intertextuality both dispute the idea that the meaning of a text belongs exclusively to its author’s intentions. Julia Kristeva, who was the first to use the term â€Å"intertextuality†, proposed the idea that a text should not be interpreted merely by its words at face value, but also studied based on other works it has adapted and was influenced by. The concept can be further expanded upon by Gunther Kress’ notion of â€Å"ceaseless semiosis† which brings to light the social aspect of a text’s creation. â€Å"From the beginning, I use materials which I have encountered before, which bear the meanings of their social contexts, to weave a new text which, because it is woven from materials of other texts, everywhere and always connects with those other texts. † -Kress, 2000 Conscious intertextuality thus enables a reader to participate in this â€Å"ceaseless semiosis† by the identification and application of their prior knowledge to a text, along with creating their own version of the text by combining their existing knowledge gleaned from other texts with the works of others a text is based on (e. g. someone watching a satirical television show such as The Simpsons). The best example of this sort of intertextuality would be the process of a reader (or surfer) browsing the world wide web. Here, an author cannot control the way in which a reader approaches his or her body of text. There is seldom a linear fashion in which a reader consumes information while surfing the internet. It is common for him or her to absorb only small chunks of texts on one page of a website before being led to an entirely different webpage via links. Through surfing and following links of their choice, readers effectively thus begin to construct their own text of sorts as they make their way through various sites on the internet. Unlike newspapers or most other forms of printed media, intertextuality on the internet is often one of a blatant and conscious nature. Here, almost more so than anywhere else, it is clear that content is not entirely original, nor is it based on an author’s sole ideas and concepts. It is common for a great many websites to host a multitude of links, and consist of short articles that link to other sources of information that the work was based on, or that provide further elaboration. Even on the internet, certain etiquettes are often observed, one of them being the courtesy of giving credit where it is due. A graphic or piece of digital art someone uses on his or her website, for example, often requires credit and a link back to the page of the artist that created it. Upon following the link to the artist’s page, one might find further credit and a link to the photographer who provided the stock photograph from which the graphic was created. One then clicks on the link that leads us to a page of stock photography, on which, perhaps, yet another link to the homepage of the model in the photograph might be provided. One visits the aforementioned homepage, and might perhaps chance upon the history of the model or a little story about his or her life. The initial graphic no longer stands on its own, and new history and meaning is produced with every link the surfer clicks, tracing a â€Å"path† that paints a story beyond the original piece of art. Hirsch’s idea of a text having one sole meaning ? that of the author’s ? no longer applies. The readers construct their own text, and therefore their own meanings as they navigate through the internet, often with no apparent logical progression. The existing knowledge they possess, along with their ability to identify the other works a text is based on, shapes their interpretation of an idea being presented. Even the authors themselves often acknowledge the lack of complete originality in their content, and through links and credit on their page, make it obvious that their text is a coalition of ideas and texts by other authors, whose texts are a coalition of ideas and texts by yet, other authors etc. There are also varying degrees of intertextuality on the internet. Some sites, such as The Onion (www. theonion. com) restricts the level of interactivity on their website by limiting links to only those of their advertisers. However, the content of their site is a testament of classic conscious intertextuality. Much like the Simpsons, â€Å"The Onion† is a satire. It parodies legitimate news websites and global current affairs. Readers’ prior knowledge of these affects the way in which they view the site and interpret these satirical â€Å"issues† of The Onion. A webpage that allows for a greater level of interactivity through its onslaught of links is â€Å"How To Dress Emo† (http://www. geocities. com/howtodressemo). A site that makes fun of a teenage trend in today’s society, the text has potential to be humorous to its reader. However, the degree of appreciation and humour a reader might find in the text depends on the level of the reader’s prior knowledge of the â€Å"Emo† trend and sub-culture. Unlike The Onion however, the white text on â€Å"How To Dress Emo† is peppered with phrases and words that are grey in colour. Existing knowledge of the internet and html might inform the reader that these grey words and phrases are in fact links, and clicking on them will lead them to further sites, games, generators and articles that provide further references and elaborate upon the original article. The internet has made it possible for authors to quote another piece of work â€Å"wholesale† by simply and conveniently placing a link on their page. The two texts become inevitably intertwined and new meaning is generated as the reader pieces together information gleaned from both works. Another form of intertextuality is one that is often based on a more subconscious level. Arguing against the idea that a text is an isolated entity, Kristeva once stated, â€Å"any text is the absorption and transformation of another†. The text in question is not limited to only that which is literary in nature, and whatever form it should take is subject to its reader’s or audience’s interpretation based on their knowledge of other existing texts, their cultural literacy and associations they individually produce. In subconscious intertextuality, interpretation is based on a highly individual level and may even produce meanings that the author had no knowledge of whatsoever, let alone intended. However, a study of subconscious intertextuality and semiotics is often useful to advertisers who then use these subtle allusions to maximum effect. The reader or audience is often unaware of the subconscious effects an advertisement has on their perception of a product. Nevertheless, through signs in commercials and print advertisements, the meanings an advertiser wishes to convey about a product are presented. Silk Cut cigarettes in England demonstrates clever advertising in their campaigns. Strict laws and restrictions are imposed on tobacco advertisements in the country, forbidding any association of sports, glamour, success, luxury, masculinity and femininity with tobacco products. Targetting a tobacco advertisement towards a certain market or denomination in society was also banned. Silk cut, however, has managed to get around such stringent laws by the use of semiotics, thus showcasing intertextuality and the ability to generate multiple meanings out of a single text. In one of their most striking advertisements in the 90’s, magazine advertorials often featured a purple silken sheet with a single oval slit in the middle. The connotations were luxurious, sexual and feminine, yet in a way that was subtle and did not violate the advertising code for tobacco. On one hand, one could explain the text as being simply representative of a ruined piece of cloth ? no more, no less. Doubtlessly, this would have been Silk Cut’s explanation had they been questioned by the law. However, on a more subconscious intertextual level, the colour purple and the expensive silken fabric could have been interpreted as an association with luxury and royalty. The texture of the cloth could also have been seen as an allusion to the smooth nature of a Silk Cut cigarette, therefore making the product appealing to women (despite the fact that targeting a specific gender or market was forbidden). The diagonal slit in the cloth could be easily interpreted as sexual in nature, and representative of a woman’s genitalia, thus giving the cigarettes a suggestive appeal. Through these clever advertisements, Silk Cut became widely known as THE woman’s cigarette of choice. They were even featured in the bestselling novel, â€Å"Bridget Jones’s Diary†. In this book by Helen Fielding, the protagonist, Bridget, smokes Silk Cut. The brand is constantly referred to throughout the novel, therefore once again making use of intertextuality. Bridget Jones spends a great deal of the book attempting to quit smoking. However, she is simply unable to curb her craving for the Silk Cut cigarettes. The qualities that have come to be associated with Silk Cut cigarettes through their advertising campaigns, can now be seen as the qualities Bridget desires by smoking Silk Cut. Once again, Hirsch’s idea of a text bearing only one singular meaning can be easily disputed. The interpretation of the Silk Cut advertisement, as well as the use of Silk Cut cigarettes in Bridget Jones’s Diary, is highly subjective and dependent on the reader’s cultural literacy and existing knowledge. Intertextuality in the media, both print and otherwise, has become too powerful to ignore, especially in this day and age. The internet, satirical texts, advertisements and books are only some examples that demonstrate the effects other works and a reader’s prior knowledge have on any given text. Intertextuality in its various states, conscious and unconscious, is certainly a valid contention against the theory of E. D. Hirsch. Bibliography, References & Notes 1) Cultural Consumption and Everyday Life†, Reading As Production, John Storey, Pg 63, Arnold, London, 1999 2) Intertextuality, Allen. G, Pg 9, Routledge, London 2000 3) http://web. uvic. ca 4) http://www. theonion. com 5) http://www. geocities. com/howtodressemo 6) http://www. aber. ac. uk 7) Reading Ads Socially. Goldman. R, Routledge, London, 1992.

Free Essays on Floriance Kelly

During the progressive Era, Florence Kelley was an important person because of all of the contribution’s that she has made trying to improve child labor for women. There were many reasons for Florence Kelley becoming interested in reform and socialism, one of the people who influenced her was Friendrich Engels. Kelley knew of the conditions that needed to ch changed in her time. Those conditions that needed to be changed influenced her passion for reform and pushed her to work harder. Organizing a child labor committee and setting a form of minimum wages for workers were only a couple of the many things that Kelley did to contribute to reform. Karl Max also being one of her many influences was only part of how Florence Kelley became interested in Socialism and reform. The first time Kelley was introduced to social reform she was attending Miss Longreth’s School. Kelley became frustrated by the obstacles that her own society put against women’s participation in public life. At the University of Zurich there she joined a community of people who embraced the teaching of socialism. She became aware of these ideas and they helped her to inform the people of the abuse to poor working people and of their working conditions. These were many of the among reasons she became interested in reform. Of the conditions that were right in front of her she knew things needed to be changed. She was then hired to the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics to investigate sweat-shops and their systems. Florence Kelley knew that the working conditions were dangerous and people were getting harmed. During this time Kelley wanted to help the children in the working industries of the time. The children were being worked for very long hours and very little pay. They also worked in harsh and dangerous conditions. One of Kelley’s main concerns was the unequal treatment in society toward women. Florence Kelley made many contributions during her time as... Free Essays on Floriance Kelly Free Essays on Floriance Kelly During the progressive Era, Florence Kelley was an important person because of all of the contribution’s that she has made trying to improve child labor for women. There were many reasons for Florence Kelley becoming interested in reform and socialism, one of the people who influenced her was Friendrich Engels. Kelley knew of the conditions that needed to ch changed in her time. Those conditions that needed to be changed influenced her passion for reform and pushed her to work harder. Organizing a child labor committee and setting a form of minimum wages for workers were only a couple of the many things that Kelley did to contribute to reform. Karl Max also being one of her many influences was only part of how Florence Kelley became interested in Socialism and reform. The first time Kelley was introduced to social reform she was attending Miss Longreth’s School. Kelley became frustrated by the obstacles that her own society put against women’s participation in public life. At the University of Zurich there she joined a community of people who embraced the teaching of socialism. She became aware of these ideas and they helped her to inform the people of the abuse to poor working people and of their working conditions. These were many of the among reasons she became interested in reform. Of the conditions that were right in front of her she knew things needed to be changed. She was then hired to the Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics to investigate sweat-shops and their systems. Florence Kelley knew that the working conditions were dangerous and people were getting harmed. During this time Kelley wanted to help the children in the working industries of the time. The children were being worked for very long hours and very little pay. They also worked in harsh and dangerous conditions. One of Kelley’s main concerns was the unequal treatment in society toward women. Florence Kelley made many contributions during her time as...

Free Essays on John F Kennedy

Statesman and 35th U.S. president (1961-63), born on May 29, 1917, in Brookline, Massachusetts; the second of Joseph and Rose Kennedy's nine children. Kennedy was the youngest man elected president of the United States, dying from an assassin’s bullet after serving less than one term in office. Kennedy attended private elementary schools, including a year at Canterbury School in New Milford, Connecticut, and four years at Choate School in Wallingford, Connecticut. He spent the summer of 1935 studying at the London School of Economics. He entered Princeton University but was forced to leave during his freshman year because of an attack of jaundice. In the fall of 1936 he enrolled at Harvard University, graduating cum laude in June 1940. During World War II, he commanded a PT (torpedo) boat in the Pacific. When the boat was rammed and sunk by a Japanese destroyer in August 1943, Kennedy, despite serious injuries, led the surviving crew through miles of perilous waters to safety. After the war, Kennedy worked for several months in 1945 as a reporter for the Hearst newspapers, covering a conference in San Francisco that established the United Nations. In 1947, he became a Democratic Congressman from Boston, and in 1952, successfully campaigned against Henry Cabot Lodge in Massachusetts to advance to the Senate. He married Jacqueline Bouvier on September 12, 1953, and the couple had two children, Caroline Bouvier (born 1957) and John Fitzgerald (born 1960). Another son, Patrick Bouvier, died shortly after birth in 1963. While recuperating from back surgery, Kennedy wrote Profiles in Courage (1956), a study of courageous political acts by eight United States senators, which won a Pulitzer Prize. Kennedy campaigned for and nearly gained the Democratic nomination for vice president in 1956, and four years later was a first-ballot nominee for president. A young, handsome and personable candidate with a beautiful wife, Kennedy enjoyed... Free Essays on John F Kennedy Free Essays on John F Kennedy Statesman and 35th U.S. president (1961-63), born on May 29, 1917, in Brookline, Massachusetts; the second of Joseph and Rose Kennedy's nine children. Kennedy was the youngest man elected president of the United States, dying from an assassin’s bullet after serving less than one term in office. Kennedy attended private elementary schools, including a year at Canterbury School in New Milford, Connecticut, and four years at Choate School in Wallingford, Connecticut. He spent the summer of 1935 studying at the London School of Economics. He entered Princeton University but was forced to leave during his freshman year because of an attack of jaundice. In the fall of 1936 he enrolled at Harvard University, graduating cum laude in June 1940. During World War II, he commanded a PT (torpedo) boat in the Pacific. When the boat was rammed and sunk by a Japanese destroyer in August 1943, Kennedy, despite serious injuries, led the surviving crew through miles of perilous waters to safety. After the war, Kennedy worked for several months in 1945 as a reporter for the Hearst newspapers, covering a conference in San Francisco that established the United Nations. In 1947, he became a Democratic Congressman from Boston, and in 1952, successfully campaigned against Henry Cabot Lodge in Massachusetts to advance to the Senate. He married Jacqueline Bouvier on September 12, 1953, and the couple had two children, Caroline Bouvier (born 1957) and John Fitzgerald (born 1960). Another son, Patrick Bouvier, died shortly after birth in 1963. While recuperating from back surgery, Kennedy wrote Profiles in Courage (1956), a study of courageous political acts by eight United States senators, which won a Pulitzer Prize. Kennedy campaigned for and nearly gained the Democratic nomination for vice president in 1956, and four years later was a first-ballot nominee for president. A young, handsome and personable candidate with a beautiful wife, Kennedy enjoyed...

A Detailed Guide On Making Atole

A Detailed Guide On Making Atole How to make Atole It was a cold day during winter break, and I was trying to catch up on my favourite show Pretty Little Liars. I was sitting in the living room and then a hot milky scent wafting from the kitchen hit me. I remember thinking that there was nothing better than a hot drink for this cold weather. I was very excited and headed straight for the kitchen. Hands holding on the edge of the doorway, peeping my head into the room, I saw my host mother making a hot beverage, and she offered me some. At first, I only tried a little bit, but then I had another sip, another one, and another one, until everything was gone. At that moment, I realized how much I liked the drink and that I would definitely need it to survive the upcoming winter days. I later found out that it was a Mexican drink called Atole. Since I was only able to enjoy the drink if someone made it for me, I decided to learn how to make it myself, which turned out to be relatively easy. There are two main stages to make this drink; th ey are buying the ingredients and then combining them to make the beverage. Before going into the instructions, it might beneficial to learn some background information about Atole. Atole is a traditional Mexican drink originating from pre-Columbian time and usually served at Dias de los muertos celebrations, which is translated as â€Å"Day of the Dead†. In Mexico, the hot thickened drink is typically made with cornmeal, water, raw sugar cane, cinnamon, and vanilla. It can also be served for breakfast on regular days or as a drink in the afternoon and late evening in place of tea, hot chocolate or coffee. With different brands, there is a wide variety of Atole flavors to choose from such as walnut, coconut, strawberry, guava, and chocolate. The only brand I had was Klass, but then I like the drink so much that I tried all their flavors and found out that walnut Atole is my favourite, which I would highly recommend to anyone. To make Klass Atole, I have to buy a package of Atole powder. Klass Atole can be found easily in grocery stores in South Texas or Northern Mexico; however, since I do not live there anymore, I have to order them online and sometimes they do not even have walnut flavor. Other than the package, the main materials needed for the process are sugar, milk, a medium-size saucepan or stockpot, a ladle, a glass or a mug, a table spoon, and measuring cups. After gathering all the materials and ingredients, all I had to do was to follow the recipe and the drink would be ready in less than half an hour. First, I put five cups of milk into a saucepan or a stockpot. After, I put the saucepan of milk on the stove on medium-high heat until the milk started to boil, which often took ten minutes. Third, while waiting for the milk to boil, I put one cup of milk into a glass or a mug and poured the entire Atole package into the container and stirred the mixture. Next, when the milk started to boil, I turned down the fire to low heat, poured the mixture into the saucepan and stirred it for one minute. Soon, I stirred about five to eight table spoons of sugar into the drink. Finally, I turned off the stove and poured out the drink into a mug and it was ready to serve. I suggest enjoying the drink with a spoon to make it easier to drink when it is still hot and delicious. As an international student who has traveled and tried new things in different parts of the United States, I have come to love Atole. I have not mastered and tried new things with Atole yet, but I am hoping to get better and better at it. It will always be a pleasure for me to introduce this appetizing drink to people all around the world.

Capstone Project Final Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 750 words

Capstone Project Final - Essay Example Perhaps the most obvious challenges associated with learning English include grammar complexity, vocabulary, slang, colloquialism, pronunciation and spelling, and the variations that exist. Setting aside this obvious challenges, cultural challenges often cloud the path of learning to write in English especially if one’s background is not western affiliated. Some of the cultural challenges are examined in this paper, drawing resources from different linguistic experts and articles in a bid to demonstrate how the challenges affect learning to write in English. In the article of Fan Shen The Classroom and the Wider Culture, Shen explores some challenges he faced while trying to learn English. Fan Shen being from a Chinese background and a Communist country of China. He grew up writing in accordance with the Chinese teachings; that bears significant variations from the Western style. Because of his background he faced a lot of challenges learning to write1. For example, Fan Shen had always known that the word â€Å"I† was not as good as we. The â€Å"we† phrase is more persuasive and influential â€Å"I† in China. The phrase â€Å"I† had negative implications and would suggest selfishness in China. In English writing, this is always not the case. Shen had to navigate a way to write according to English principles despite the cultural Chinese influences. He adopted a unique method to implement this, personifying himself to be born again as an English self-speaker2. The new self was distinct from his former self. B y this, he was able to adopt the English writing customs without losing his Chinese self in linguistics. Second English language learner’s beliefs are accorded negligible attention when considering cultural challenges of learning English. It is evident that English learners bear themselves with a complicated web of cultural experiences, beliefs, attitudes and expectations when